17 white Afrikaner farmers murdered in South Africa thus far in 2013: 13 SANDF died in military campaign Central African Republic

More white farmers are murdered on South African farmers than SANDF soldiers died in military action in Central African Republic – “17 South African farmers were murdered in SA: and 13 SANDF soldiers were killed in Central African Republic. There are more farmers killed thus far this year (17 in 44 farm-attacks in SA since Jan 2013), said Freedom Front Plus party MP Pieter Groenewald (tel 083 627 4397). He slammed the lack of security for South African farmers while the ANC-regime spends millions on an ill-fated military adventure to protect its own financial interests in the Central African Repubic. Groenewald said that more farmers are dying on South African farms from armed-gang activities than SA soldiers died in ‘defence operations’ in the Central African Republic.”The slaughter on farms continues, after Paul Schulte shot dead in Muldersdrift on April 3 2013. “Despite the numerous calls of the Freedom Front Plus on government to declare farm attacks a priority crime, no finger is being lifted to give attention to the matter.In contrast with this, billions of rand are spent on defence equipment and personnel to assist African countries to protect their (financial) interests.To date this year, 17 people have already been murdered in 44 farm attacks in South Africa. These figures were obtained from media reports which have been collected by the Transvaal Agricultural Union’s unit for farm murders, as no other official statistics on farm attacks are being kept. According to these (very understated) figures, 685 people have been murdered in 1 234 farm attacks in the past ten years. In the latest incident, Mr. Paul Schulte, the manager of the popular Heia Safari Resort in Muldersdrift, West of Johannesburg, was shot dead on Tuesday morning while he was on his way to his house. The founder of the resort, Mr. Franz Richter, was also murdered on the farm in 2007.On Sunday, Ms. Liesl Botha, also from Muldersdrift, was overpowered in her home and robbed. Her daughter, Alyssa (13), was shot dead on the plot and her father seriously injured last year.After the tragic death of the 13 South African troops in the Central African Republic (CAR), the government intervened on the highest level and president Jacob Zuma and a senior cabinet minister delegation this week flew to Chad for urgent talks.
The official reason given for South African troop’s presence in the CAR is to help with “training, disarming and demobilising”. The assistance will last until 2018 at a cost of R21 million a month, which would amount to a total of R1,26 billion over five years.”
Mr. Pieter Groenewald, the Freedom Front Plus’ chief spokesperson on Police and Defence, says that government will have to account for the exact reasons for its presence in Africa.”It is understandable that South Africa is involved in other places in Africa for strategic reasons. But is the country’s farming community not one of its biggest strategic interest resources?
“The time has come for government to pay as much time, effort and money to their (the farmer’s) safety and protection as it is paying for its interests abroad,” Groenewald says.
Statement issued by Mr. Pieter Groenewald, FF Plus spokesman on Police, April 3 2013
http://www.vfplus.org.za/index.php/mediaverklarings/186-meer-sterf-in-plaasaanvalle-as-in-weermag-operasies

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ANC youth league leader threatens to start 'land-war' to take white-owned land by force

With ANCYL youth leaders again threatening to start a land-war with whites to 'occupy the land'-- How much of SA's land is already in black hands? -- DETAILS provided by Frans Cronje 27 February 2012 article on: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639?oid=282525&sn=Detail&pid=71639 ----------------------- DATA BELOW was drawn from data provided by SA government on: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid=239919&sn=Detail&pid=72308 and on: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71656?oid=238666&sn=Detail&pid=71656 ---------------------- Frans Cronje of the SA Institute for Race Relations, says the land-issue is a contentious one, but the ANC is blaming whites for 'still owning 80% of the total land surface -- when in fact it was already clear from the land-ownserhip documentation by the government itself, that by the start of 2011 considerably more than 50% was in the hands of the State and of black-communities. ---------------------- Research and Policy Brief: Land ownership and land reform in South Africa - 27th February 2012: "Dr Pieter Mulder has courted great controversy with comments that black South Africans have no historical claim to land in the Northern and Western Cape and also that blacks own a greater share of the country's land than the government admits. His comments come against claims by the ANC-regime that "whites owned 87% of South Africa's land and that little progress has been made in changing this picture". Cronje writes in Rapport newspaper: "some basic arithmetic reveals that a far greater share of the country is in black hands than is often acknowledged. It is also apparent that ensuring the productivity of the portion remaining in white hands is increasingly important to the Government in maintaining political stability in urban areas. This has implications for the manner in which future land policy is implemented. Any discussion on land ownership in South Africa risks generating more heat than light. Part of the reason for this is that few people who enter the discussion bother to do any research into current land ownership patterns. Very few of Dr Mulder's critics chose to challenge him on points of fact but resorted to all manner of racial taunts and insults. Let us take another approach and do the arithmetic to see who actually owns how much of South Africa's land. South Africa has a total surface area of 122 million hectares. As of March 2011 31 million hectares or 25% of that surface area was in the hands of the State. The remaining 91 million hectares or 75% of the surface area was privately owned. The balance of State and privately owned land varied greatly between provinces. For example in the great expanses of the Free State and the Northern Cape private owners held 89% and 91% of the surface area respectively. In both the Western Cape and Gauteng 55% was held by the State. State owned land would previously have been regarded as part of the white owned 87%. It follows then that it should now be regarded as black owned, which means that at least a quarter of the country's surface area is in black hands. There is nothing preventing the State from handing title to much of that land to black people. Since 1996 2.6 million hectares or the equivalent 2.1% of all land has been handed to blacks via land restitution programmes. This figure pushes the amount of land in black hands to at least 27.1%. In addition more than R5 billion was paid out to restitution claimants who accepted cash payments instead of having land returned to them. That R5 billion was sufficient to purchase an additional 2.6 million hectares which would have pushed the amount of land in black hands to just on 30%. The land redistribution programme, which is a distinct programme from the land restitution programme, had by 2010 handed a further 3.1 million hectares, or 2.5% of the surface area, to black South Africans pushing up the share of black owned land to at least 32.5%. This figure is more than double that of the 13% often cited by government officials. These calculations have not taken into account land traded in the market between private owners. This is because accurate data on the extent of such trades does not exist. There is significant anecdotal evidence that such trading between former white and new black landowners has taken place. Whether the amounts traded are equivalent to 10% or 15% or 20% of the surface area of the country cannot be known. However any of these figures would push the figure for black land ownership to between 40% and 50% of South Africa's surface area. If the 49 million hectares of the Western Cape and Northern Cape are subtracted from the total that blacks are entitled to then their share of ownership would rise even further. However it is here that Dr Mulder makes a dangerous political miscalculation. Dr Mulder's history is of course correct that white colonists moving from South to North met black colonists moving from North to South in or around the vicinity of the Little and the Great Fish rivers. However using that history to imply that blacks have no claim to the Northern and Western Cape, is to imply that whites have no legitimate claim to the northern reaches of the country. This is a position that Dr Mulder's supporters in the Free State and former Northern and Western Transvaals would have a problem with. Of course figures about surface areas tell us nothing about the value of the land held by different groups. A hectare in the Cape Winelands may be worth many hundreds of hectares in the Karoo. Likewise a commercial farm that has benefited from decades of investment in infrastructure will be worth a great deal more than a piece of undeveloped land in the same area with the same soils and the same rainfall. Hence the numbers that we have calculated are at best a very crude representation of the picture of property ownership in South Africa. They do, however, tell us one important thing and this is that actual patterns of ownership bear little resemblance to the picture presented by many land activists and officials in the government. It must be expected that many of the proponents of land reform and redistribution would still make the point that having 50% of land in the hands of 10% of the population is unfair and unjust and must be changed. Here they should tread carefully. The bulk of this 50% is in all probability in the hands of commercial farmers. There are only an estimated 30 000 of these farmers left in South Africa down from 60 000 fifteen years ago. This averages out to approximately 1 500 hectares per farming unit in 2010 up from 750 hectares at the time of South Africa's political transition. This figure would of course vary greatly from one region of the country to the next but it is a plausible average figure. The increase in the average size of a farming unit indicates that farmers have found it necessary to expand their operations considerably in order to benefit from economies of scale that allow them to remain productive. This is especially so considering that they do not benefit from the protectionist measures that apply to their competitors in Western Europe and North America. At the same time that farming operations were getting bigger and more efficient their markets in urban areas were also expanding. In 2010 62% of South Africans lived in urban areas up from 52% in 1990. However levels of poverty and unemployment in urban areas remain extremely high and poor urban households will find it very difficult to absorb the impact of high levels of food price inflation. In fact it is quite plausible that steep food price increases could trigger a political reaction, in urban areas, that the government would find difficult to contain. This is especially so in an environment that has seen the number of major service delivery protests against the State increase by 1000% over a period of less than a decade. Consider then that it is accepted that eight out of ten land reform projects has failed or is failing and to call for accelerated reform is to court political disaster for the government and the ANC. People who comment on land reform in South Africa would therefore do well to consider the following points: The first is that the amount of land in black hands is not 13% but may be as high as 50%. The second is that the 50% in white hands is held by South Africa's food producers and that their numbers are shrinking very quickly as urban markets demand ever more cost effective production methods. The third is that any policy that compromises the ability of those farmers to produce food may trigger a series of urban protests that the government may find difficult to control. Frans Cronje is deputy CEO of the South African Institute of Race Relations. A version of this article first appeared in Rapport on 26 February 2011. (PICTURE OF GRAPHS ATTACHED) Politicsweb: Land ownership patterns in South Africa as of January 2011: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639?oid=282525&sn=Detail&pid=71639

Hatecrimes: Genocide Indicators since Jan 1 2013 to March 26 2013 against whites in South Africa: In the first three months of 2013, there were 74 'genocidal' hatecrimes against 'whites' in South Africa in Gauteng province; six in KZN, 10 in the Free State, 1 in the Northern Cape, 12 in the Western Cape and 8 in the Eastern Cape. 

Hatespeech: New Black Panther party leader calls for Killing All Whites in South Africa, plans to visit March

 Leader of NewBlackPanthers calls for 'Killing All Whites in South Africa'; plans to attend Sharpeville commemorations in SA. The leader of the 'New Black Panther' party in the USA, which is labelled as a 'Hate Group' by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and human rights groups, writes the following on their website:================ "Dear New Black Panther Party, I'm asking on behalf of the National Central Committee and our National Chairman that you make an early donation to the revolutionary trip to South Africa using Western Union to Malik Zulu Shabazz moneygram or our National Paypal using Email: Attorney.Shabazz@yahoo.com All regions should be represented. All NBPP not going should donate-this is the most important mission at hand call in tonight and pledge and tell us whem the pledge can be fulfilled.Sacrifice. 8pm EST http://blogtalkradio.com/freedomordeath telephone: (646)478-4447 FOR MORE INFORMATION VISIT THE OFFICIAL TRIP SITE http://www.nbppafrica.com Pic and video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiY170jCzUM ============================= Background: "The Sharpeville incident on 21 March 1960 took place at the (surrounded) police station in the township Sharpeville in the Transvaal which on the first 24 hours of the rioting had 20 young, inexperienced and reportedly terrified, exhausted white and black police officers inside. Most of the policemen had already been coping with the situation for over twenty-four hours without respite. This was the first time in SA history that such a very large crowd of black men armed with traditional weapons and rocks had surrounded an entire police station - a mob of 19,000 (described as 'menacing') the 20 inexperienced police officers inside. The toll from the Sharpeville massacre was 69 people killed (including 4 black police officers; and injured: 26 Black and 60 White policemen, and 365 Black civilians injured. Police reports in 1960 stated afterwards that young and inexperienced police officers panicked and opened fire spontaneously, setting off a chain reaction that lasted about forty seconds. The official death rate was 69 people killed. It is likely that the police were already nervous as two months before the massacre nine constables had been murdered under similar circumstances at Cato Manor. The increasingly agitated mob adopted a common attitude which was described as 'insulting, menaching and provocative'. Only 130 police reinforcements were rushed in. There is considerably evidence that the police officers - untrained in crowd control - were becoming increasingly frightened. Lieutenant Colonel Pienaar, the commanding officer of the 130 police reinforcements at Sharpeville, said in his statement at the inquiry commission afterwards that "the native mentality does not allow them to gather for a peaceful demonstration. For them to gather means violence." He denied giving any order to fire and stated that he would not have done so.The SA Air Force was asked to fly Sabre Jets and Harvard Training low over the crowd in an attempt to scatter them. The protestors responded by hurling stones (striking three people) and making repeated attempts to charge the (singular fence consisting of) the police barricades. Tear gas proved ineffectual, and policemen were forced to repel these advances with their batons. At about 1:00 pm the police tried to arrest an alleged ringleader. There was a scuffle, and the throng surged forward. At least two officers present on the scene warned their men to load firearms but stressed they were only to be used in cases of dire emergency. Protestors began screaming as they succeeded in reaching the fence and tearing the gates from their hinges. One police commander was thrown to the ground; others thrown with ' makeshift projectiles '. The shooting began shortly thereafter. =========================== sources: -- The Commission of Enquiry into the Sharpeville Massacre: (27 volumes: UK National Archives, York University, Borthwick Institute of Archives: "South Africa, Commission of Enquiry to enquire into the events in the District of Vereeniging, namely the Sharpeville location, and Evaton, and Vanderbijlpark, Transvaal Province on ====================== 21 March 1960: "The typescript evidence to the Commission has been bound in five volumes. It includes statements and cross-examination records of the principal Pan-Africanist Congress organisers and the key police officers involved. As well as providing a detailed record of the events of 21st March 1960, the evidence also contains considerable detail on PAC activity within the location in the weeks preceding the massacre. Unpublished typescript. Text in English and Afrikaans." nationalarchives gov uk =============== -- In 2012 the SA police shooting 34 striking miners during the #Marikana miners' strike in August 2012 is widely compared to Sharpeville as police finding themselves in similar situations.